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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 1893, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 1 deportation has been considered something other than
punishment. 2 It has been considered a civil tool for border control and,
thus, a remedial measure rather than a punitive measure. 3 As a civil
remedial measure, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that
constitutional criminal protections are not applicable to deportation. 4
Additionally, the Court has yet to acknowledge other substantive
constitutional restraints on the state's power to deport noncitizens.
At the time that Fong Yue Ting was decided, deportation was only
used to correct admissions mistakes. 5 Deportation grounds were based on
inadmissibility rather than post-entry behavior.6 Within the last 117

t Assistant Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. B.A., 1995, summa
cum laude, Spelman College; M. Litt., 1998, University of Oxford; J.D., 2000, Harvard
Law School. Legal Advisor, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal; Former Associate, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Former Law Clerk, Judge
Carlos F. Lucero, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Special thanks to Laura
Heymann for bringing the BMW v. Gore line of cases to my attention.
1. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
2. /d. at 709, 730.
3. /d. at 706-07.
4. !d. at 724-25.
5. !d. at 725.
6. See id. at 709. Deportation was authorized for Chinese citizens who did not have a
valid certificate of residency. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 726. This certificate was
evidence that the individual was authorized to be present in the United States. /d. Absent
this certificate the individual would not be admitted to the United States. /d.
1651
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years, the purpose of deportation has expanded. Now it not only serves to
remedy incorrect admissions decisions and deal with those who evaded
the admission process, but it also seeks to regulate the post-entry
behavior of noncitizens. The vast majority of the grounds upon which a
noncitizen can be deported are based on post-entry criminal activity. 7
This latter goal is met by incapacitating dangerous noncitizens who
threaten public safety and deterring noncitizens from engaging in
particular criminal activities. 8 The expansion of the goals and purposes of
deportation calls for a reevaluation of the applicable constitutional
limitations on the state's power to deport noncitizens.
Recognizing the non-remedial aspects of deportation requires
exploring how and when deportation is punitive and the corresponding
constitutional implications. Numerous scholars have recognized the
punitive nature of deportation and argued for the application of
constitutional criminal protections to deportation.9 I offer an alternative
basis for constitutional restraints on deportation: that the Fifth
Amendment requires civil punitive measures to be proportionate. The
Fifth Amendment protects against arbitrary government action
procedurally and substantively. 10 The Court has recognized the liberty
interests at stake with deportation and has required procedural due
process protections in deportation proceedings. 11 Fifth Amendment
challenges based on substantive due process have yet to be successful.
The Court's recent jurisprudence, however, in the area of due process
and punitive damages provides a new opportunity for rethinking
constitutional constraints on civil punitive measures. The Court has
acknowledged that punishment, regardless of whether it is civil or
criminal, is subject to various constitutional restraints. 12 This is an
important development in recognizing that the state's power to deport
noncitizens is not unlimited, as initially declared in Fong Yue Ting. 13

Consequently, deportation was appropriately seen as remedial-the state was correcting
an admission mistake. ld at 709.
7. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237 (current version at 8 U.S.C.A §
1227) (West 2010)).
8. The legislative history of the 1996 immigration reforms illustrates that lawmakers
were under the impression that traditional criminal sanctions are inadequate deterrents for
noncitizens. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least
Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REv. 305, 333-34 (2000).
9. See, e.g., id. at 345.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
II. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86,99-101 (1903).
12. Pauw, supra note 8, at 345.
13. !d. at 337-44.
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The idea that the power to deport is subject to limitations has been
argued not only by numerous immigration scholars, but also by human
rights scholars. International law, specifically human rights treaties,
provides the basis for human rights scholars' arguments that the power to
deport is not absolute. 14 They rely upon the jurisprudence of human
rights treaty bodies like the Human Rights Committee and the European
Court of Human Rights, which have found that the right to family life
limits state parties' ability to deport noncitizens in specific contexts. 15 As
a state party to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), scholars have argued that U.S. courts should play a more active
role in ensuring U.S. compliance with its treaty obligations. 16 Judicial use
of this jurisprudence is offered as one mechanism for increasing treaty
compliance. 17 This international jurisprudence is based on a
fundamentally different conception of a state's immigration power and
consequently different allocations of immigration authority within a
state. 18 These differences minimize the applicability of this jurisprudence
in the United States and reinforce the need for domestic translation and
adaptation of human rights treaty obligations. 19 Using the recent
recognition of constitutional limits on the state's power to punish in the
civil context provides a domestically-rooted basis for reaching the human
rights scholars' desired outcome-proportionality review of deportation
decisions based on an individual's fundamental liberty interest in family
life.
Part II of this Essay argues that certain categories of deportation are
punitive and not merely remedial and that punitive deportation is subject
to proportionality review under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
14. Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1070 (2002).
15. !d.
16. See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 347 (2000); see also Shayana Kadidal, "Federalizing"
Immigration Law: International Law as a Limitation on Congress "s Power to Legislate in
the Field of Immigration, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 501 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of
Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
17. E.g., Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007).
18. Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question?, GEO.
STATE. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) [hereinafter Deporting Families]; see also Michael J.
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501-12 (2001); Andrew B. Ayers,
Note, International Law as a Tool of Constitutional Interpretation in the Early
Immigration Power Cases, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 125, 147 (2004).
19. See Banks, supra note 18.
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Clause. Part II articulates how our current deportation regime does not
have procedural mechanisms available to prevent excessive or
unreasonable deprivations of family privacy. This Part concludes by
arguing that this approach to constitutional restraints on deportation
provides a domestic legal basis for compliance with our international
obligations under the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). 20 While there is room to debate whether or not specific
deportation decisions impermissibly restrain an individual's right to
family life or family privacy, it is clear that both the U.S. Constitution
and the ICCPR require that the United States have a procedural
mechanism in place for making that determination.
II. DEPORTATION AS PUNISHMENT

Numerous scholars have written about the punitive aspects of
deportation and have concluded that the constitutional criminal
procedure protections should apply to deportation? 1 These scholars differ
in the extent to which they contend that there should be a wholesale
incorporation of criminal procedure into deportation proceedings, but
they all recognize the importance of at least some criminal procedural
protections and the value they would add to deportation proceedings. In
this essay I argue for a different reference point: civil punitive sanctions.
Deportation has historically been understood as a civil remedial measure,
but that does not mean that certain aspects of the system are not punitive.
Courts have struggled with drawing the line between remedial and
punitive civil sanctions, but it is a line that is drawn, and civil punitive
sanctions are subject to constitutional limitations. The traditional
comparison between criminal law and deportation is natural when one
considers the increasingly punitive nature of deportation in our current
system. However, civil sanctions can be punitive, and this body of law
provides a useful basis for rethinking deportation. In particular, it calls
into question the use of the "exceptional and extremely unusual

20. International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
21. See, e.g., DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (2007); Demleitner, supra note 14; Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113
HARV. L. REv. 1889 (2000); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469
(2007); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime
Control After September lith, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); Pauw, supra note 8.
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hardship" standard currently used to determine eligibility for cancellation
of removal. 22
Punishment, whether in the criminal or civil context, must be
proportionate. 23 While the Eighth Amendment ensures proportionality in
the criminal context, 24 the Fifth Amendment does so in the civil
context. 25 Proportionality provides a basis for ensuring that the
appropriate balance is struck between restraining fundamental liberty
interests and punishment. Our current regulatory scheme does not
provide adequate mechanisms for ensuring that this balance is struck in
individual deportation decisions.

A. Remedial Deportation versus Punitive Deportation
Deportation, within the immigration context, has historically been
treated as something other than punishment. In Fang Yue Ting, the Court
stated:
The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime .... It is
but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an
alien who has not complied with the conditions upon the
performance of which the government of the nation, acting
within its constitutional authority, and through the proper
departments, has determined that his continuing to reside here
shall depend. 26
The Court's discussion of punishment is based on a distinction
between the civil context and criminal context in which punishment only
occurs in the criminal context. This conception of punishment is no
longer viable because the Supreme Court has recognized that remedial
22. See INA§ 240A(b)(I)(D) (West 2010).
23. See Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines:" The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 882-83 (2004).
24. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VIII.
25. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); BMW
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994);
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
26. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. The Court also noted that
"Deportation" is the removal of an alien out of the country simply because his
presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any
punishment being imposed or contemplated, either under the laws of the
country out of which he is sent or under those of the country to which he is
taken.
/d. at 709.
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and punitive measures exist in both civil and criminal contexts. 27 Thus,
the key question in determining whether or not a sanction is punishment
is not whether it is criminal or civil, but whether it is remedial or
punitive.28 Punitive measures in both contexts are subject to
29
constitutionallimitations. The Eighth Amendment ensures that criminal
punishments are not cruel and unusual while the Fifth Amendment
protects against excessive civil punitive measures? 0
Much of the literature arguing that deportation is punishment focuses
on applying constitutional criminal procedural protections to deportation
proceedings. 31 While scholars differ with regard to which criminal
procedural protections should apply, there is general agreement that
criminal law provides the most appropriate analogy for deportation
reform.32 What this literature overlooks is the jurisprudence regarding
excessive civil penalties and the Fifth Amendment as a basis for limiting
deportation in specific contexts.
Within the civil context, it is necessary to distinguish between
remedial measures and punitive measures because punitive measures
give rise to particular constitutional limitations. 33 In deciding whether a
civil measure is remedial or punitive, the Court has looked to both
history and congressional intent to conduct an independent evaluation of
the relationship between the sanction and the remedial purposes. 34
Through each of these inquiries the Court has sought to determine
whether or not the measure "serves the goals of punishment"deterrence and retribution. 35 Sanctions can serve both remedial and
punitive purposes. As a result, the Court's inquiries have looked to see if
the sanction can partially be explained as punitive rather than exclusively
explained as punitive. Thus, in Austin v. United States, the Court
concluded that in rem civil forfeiture "historically ha[s] been understood,
at least in part, as punishment," and thus the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against excessive fines was applicable. 36
27. Pauw, supra note 8, at 314-21.
28. Austin, 509 U.S. at 609; see also Pauw, supra note 8.
29. See Pauw, supra note 8, at 337-43 .
30. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII .
31 . See, e.g., KANSTROOM, Deportation, supra note 21; Pauw, supra note 8.
32. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 476 n. l2.
33. While this distinction between remedial and punitive measures is also relevant in
the criminal context, this paper focuses on the civil context because our immigration
system has been set up as a civil system, and there are numerous reasons to favor this
approach over a criminal approach. See also Legomsky, supra note 21, at 524-27.
34. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 603-18 (considering history and congressional intent); see
also Pauw, supra note 8, at 324.
35. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,448 (1989).
36. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
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A growing literature has developed that examines the increasing
overlap and similarities between criminal justice practices and theories
justifying criminal justice punishment and immigration regulation and
enforcement. 37 This literature, broadly referred to as "crimmigration,"
has raised important questions about the continued denomination of
immigration regulation as a civil regulatory system. 38 This is particularly
true with regard to deportation, which historically has been understood to
be something other than criminal punishment by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 39 A number of scholars writing in the area of crimmigration have
articulated the specific ways in which certain uses of deportation are in
fact punitive. 40 These scholars have pointed to the historical meaning of
deportation, congressional intent, and the severity of the consequences.
For each of these factors scholars have identified deterrence, retribution,
or incapacitation as the justification for deportation, which mirrors the
traditional justifications for criminal punishment. 41 An analysis of these
factors leads scholars to conclude that deportation can be punitive and is
deserving of the constitutional protections provided to criminal
sanctions. 42 I offer an additional conclusion, which is that the punitive
nature of deportation in certain circumstances gives rise to a substantive
due process right to proportionality. Proportional deportation does not
depend on conceptualizing deportation as criminal, only as punitive.
Since 1893, when Fang Yue Ting was decided, the Supreme Court has
become more willing to recognize the punitive aspects of civil sanctions
and accord appropriate constitutional protections to such sanctions. 43
37. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 476 n.l2.
38. !d.
39. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730; see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 535 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) ("[w]hile the consequences of deportation may
assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as punishment."). As Daniel Kanstroom has
noted, "[t]his principle reduces to the basic idea that noncitizens have no substantive
claim to remain in the United States and are therefore subject to whatever rules Congress
chooses to make, even if they are retroactive. They are not being punished; they are
simply being regulated." Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1895. The Court's
cases have focused on denying that deportation is punishment and emphasizing that
deportation is civil. The increasing awareness by the Court of constitutional protections
for civil punitive sanctions minimizes the importance of the civil criminal distinction.
See, e.g., Hudson, 522 U.S. 93; BMW, 517 U.S. 559; Ursery, 518 U.S. 267.
40. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 19; Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note
21, at 1903-04; Legomsky, supra note 21, at 524-25; Pauw, supra note 8, at 337-45.
41. See, e.g., Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1894.
42. See, e.g., id.
43. Hudson, 522 U.S. 93; Ursery, 518 U.S. 267; BMW, 517 U.S. 559; Kurth Ranch,
511 U.S. 767; Austin, 509 U.S. 602; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I (1991); Halper, 490 U.S.
435.
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This can be seen in the development of grossly excessive pumtiVe
damages jurisprudence. 44 These developments provide a new opportunity
for thinking about the appropriate constitutional checks on the state's
power to deport noncitizens. However, both the criminal justice approach
and the proportionality approach require an initial determination that
deportation is punitive rather than remedial.
I contend that deportation currently serves three general purposes:
( 1) remedying incorrect admissions decisions or border enforcement; (2)
incapacitating noncitizens who pose a threat to public safety; and (3)
deterring noncitizens from engaging in particular criminal activities. The
first purpose adheres to Kanstroom's border control model, 45 while the
latter two adhere to his post-entry social control model. 46 The border
control model reflects a state's efforts to control access to its territory
while the post-entry social control model prohibits "criminal or political
conduct within the United States, often without time limit.'"' 7 The border
control model addresses evasion of border controls through surreptitious
entry, fraud, or misrepresentation, and it also provides for the deportation
of individuals who violate explicit conditions of entry .48 Deportation in
each of these contexts does not necessarily constitute punishment. 49 This
Essay focuses on the punitive aspects of post-entry crime-related
deportation because the extended border control model of deportation is
essentially remedial in nature. Post-entry crime-related deportation has
grown exponentially since 1996 and was not the basis for deportation at
the time that Fang Yue Ting was decided. 5°
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) currently authorizes the
Attorney General to remove noncitizens who were inadmissible "at the
time of their entry or adjustment of status, present in violation of the INA
44. BMW, 517 U.S. 559; TXO, 509 U.S. 443; Haslip, 499 U.S. 1.
45. KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 4-6.
46. Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1897.
47. KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 5.
48. /d.; see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 500 (4th ed. 2005) ("Deportation was originally conceived as a device for
removing those noncitizens who should not have entered in the first place . . . .");
Legomsky, supra note 21, at 487-88 ("[E]ach of these deportation laws was in effect a
check on the admissions process. Each called for deporting those who were not supposed
to have been admitted in the first place."). This later notion of immigration control is
often conceptualized as immigration as contract. See HIROSHI MoTOMURA, AMERICANS IN
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
(2007); Legomsky, supra note 21, at 487.
49. See Pauw, supra note 8, at 337.
50. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1908 ("Constitutional deportation
doctrine developed in the late nineteenth century in relation to laws that were primarily a
form of extended border control.").
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or other U.S. law, or failed to maintain their nonimmigrant status."51
These deportation grounds facilitate remedying admissions mistakes. In
cases in which the government admitted individuals that it should not
have or failed to prevent the entry of individuals it should have, the
government can correct these mistakes with deportation. 52 Additionally,
individuals who were admitted for a specific purpose and for a specific
time period are deportable once that purpose has been contravened or the
time period expires. 53 These are all ways in which deportation serves a
remedial purpose. There is nothing necessarily punitive about the use of
deportation in this context.
This remedial approach to deportation began in 1882 with the
Chinese Exclusion Act when Congress determined that certain Chinese
laborers were inadmissible to the United States and required a certificate
of residency to establish admissibility. 54 Chinese nationals without the
certificate were deemed to be in the United States in violation of the law
and thus deportable. Congress expanded this type of border enforcement
in 1891 when it provided for the deportation of noncitizens who entered
the United States in violation of the law and those who became a public
charge within one year of admission due to causes existing before
admission. 55 The one-year statute of limitations was extended to three
years in 1907. 56 Three years later, the first post-entry conduct-based
deportation grounds were enacted. 57 At that time, Congress targeted
prostitutes and provided that "any alien woman or girl who shall be
51. INA§ 237(a)(I )(A)-(C)(i).
52. !d.
53. INA§ 237(a)( I )(D).
54. See Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) (repealed 1943), available at
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=47 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010); Kanstroom,
Deportation, supra note 21, at 1908.
55. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § II, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086 (amending the various acts
relative to immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to
perform labor).
56. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. I 134, § 20, 34 Stat. 898 (regulating the immigration of
aliens into the United States).
57. See KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 125-26. The 1907 immigration law provided
for the deportation of "any alien woman or girl who shall be found an inmate of a house
of prostitution or practicing prostitution, at any time within three years after she shall
have entered the United States .... " Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch 1134, § 3, 34 Stat, 898.
While this sounds as though it is targeting post-entry conduct, Professor Kanstroom has
noted that this law "actually related to the long-standing attempt to prevent the entry of
prostitutes into the United States." KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 125. The three-year
limit proved problematic because it was difficult to determine when admission had
occurred, allowing noncitizens to avoid deportation by lying about their admission date.
!d. at 125-26. By eliminating the three-year time period, the 1910 immigration law
created the first post-entry conduct-based deportation ground. !d. at 126.
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found an inmate of a house of prostitution" or practicing prostitution may
be deported.58 Since 1910, the number of deportation grounds based on
post-entry criminal activity and actual deportations has grown
exponentially. Between 1908 and 1986, only seven percent of all
deportations were for post-entry crime-related reasons, 59 and these
deportations never numbered more than 2,000 per year.60 Since 1986,
post-entry crime related deportations have accounted for more than
twenty percent of all deportations, and they accounted for at least fifty
percent of all deportations in 1993, 1994, and 1995. 61
Post-entry crime-based deportation raises a different set of questions
and concerns regarding punishment than extended border control
deportation. Three main arguments supporting the idea that deportation
in this context can be punitive are: the historical understanding of
deportation as punishment, congressional intention that deportation serve
to punish noncitizen criminal offenders, and the severity of the
consequences. 62 The historical link between the purposes of deportation,
transportation, and banishment support the idea that deportation is
punitive. Historically, these sanctions have been used to remove
convicted criminals from a country's, state's, or community's borders. 63
Banishment for criminal activity was not limited to noncitizens, but
rather was a punishment available to individuals who violated the
criminal codes of the community. 64 Post-entry crime-related deportation
mirrors this historical use of banishment-removing the undesirable
from the nation's borders. 65 Noncitizens who have been convicted of
crimes present a risk to public safety, and the most effective means of
incapacitating such dangerous individuals is to deport them. 66
Incapacitation is a typical rationale for criminal punishment, but it can
also justify remedial sanctions. For example, in the civil context,
incapacitation is used to justify civil commitments to protect the health
58. Act of Mar. 26, 1910, ch. 128 § 2, 36 Stat. 263, 265 (repealed 1917).
59. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 486.
60. /d. at 488.
61. /d. at 488-89.
62. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 603, 619; Legomsky, supra note 21, at 512-15; Pauw,
supra note 8, at 324.
63. KANSTROOM, supra note 21, at 27, 39-43. British convicts were frequently sent to
the British colonies, such as the United States or Australia, and free people of color and
enslaved individuals were subjected to banishment. /d. at 42-43, 74-83. "From ancient
Rome to eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, France, and Russia, common forms of
criminal punishment included exile, banishment, and transportation (particularly by
Britain to the American and Australian colonies)." Legomsky, supra note 21, at 513.
64. See Legomsky, supra note 21 , at 5 13.
65. !d. at 514.
66. Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1892.
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and safety of individuals and the community at large. 67 Thus, an
incapacitation justification for deportation alone would not be sufficient
to classify deportation as punitive. However, the historical use of
banishment and transportation to punish convicted criminals supports the
idea that crime-related deportation has a similar purpose-punishment.
Understanding deportation as having a punitive purpose is also
supported by looking at the intent of members of Congress in broadening
the category of crime-related deportation grounds, particularly through
the definition of an aggravated felony. 68 The expansion of the definition
of an aggravated felony has played a significant role in the growing
relationship between criminal activity and deportation. Proponents of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)69 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) 70 understood deportation as an additional punishment for
convicted criminals who are noncitizens. Senator Spencer Abraham (RMich.) remarked, "You don't shut down the borders. What you do is you
say we're going to apply the criminal laws more harshly." 71 The AEDPA
and IIRIRA dramatically increased the types of criminal activity that
made noncitizens deportable and made these deportation grounds
retroactive. 72 The acts eliminated or significantly reduced access to
discretionary relief from deportation and eliminated judicial review for

67. Pauw, supra note 8, at 326-27.
68. An aggravated felony is a term of art defined in section 10l(a)(43) of the INA.
The current list of aggravated felonies includes murder, rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or explosive materials, money laundering,
crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year, theft (including
receipt of stolen property), burglary, extortion, child pornography, racketeering or
gambling, prostitution offenses, slavery offenses, espionage offenses, fraud or deceit
involving a loss of more than $10,000, alien smuggling, improper alien entry, and
immigration related document fraud. INA § 10l(a)(43) (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. §
1101(a)(43) (West 2010)).
If an individual has been convicted of an aggravated felony that person no longer
has access to discretionary relief from deportation and they are barred from being
readmitted to the United States permanently. INA §§ 10l(a)(43), 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)(II)
(2009).
69. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ADEPA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40
and 42 U.S.C.).
70. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, I 10 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of8 and 18 U.S.C.).
71. See Lisa Zagaroli, Senators Use Rank to Set Pet Priorities: Achievements of
Immigrants Get Hearing From Senator Abraham, DET. NEWS, Mar. 23, 1997, at BS.
72. Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21, at 1891.
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certain types of criminal deportation orders. 73 Senator William Roth (RDel.) noted that broadening the definition of aggravated felonies made
"more crimes punishable by deportation." 74 Representative Xavier
Becerra (D-Cal.) argued that while "deportation is an acceptable
punishment, permanent exile is too harsh." 75 The expansion of crimerelated deportation grounds in the 1990s was motivated in part to punish
noncitizens who violate U.S. criminallaw. 76
Finally, deportation is a serious sanction causing not only the lives of
the deported noncitizen to be uprooted, but also potentially the lives of
their spouses and children who may be United States citizens or lawful
permanent residents (LPRs). The potential harshness of deportation is
something that Supreme Court justices have noted throughout history. In
the initial case concluding that deportation is not punishment Justice
Brewer dissented:
[I]t needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that
deportation is punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly
taken away from home and family and friends and business and
property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, Is
punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel. 77
In 1952, Justice Douglas made a similar observation, stating:

Banishment is punishment in the practical sense. It may deprive
a man and his family of all that makes life worth while. Those
who have their roots here have an important stake in this
country. Their plans for themselves and their hopes for their
children all depend on their right to stay. If they are uprooted and
sent to lands no longer known to them, no longer hospitable,
they become displaced, homeless people condemned to
.
. 78
and despa1r.
bItterness
The potential harshness of deportation becomes apparent when
lawful permanent residents can be deported due to a misdemeanor

73 . /d.
74. /d. at 1894 n.20 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S4600 (1996) (statement of Sen.
William Roth)).
75. /d. (quoting 142 CONG. REc. H2376-87, H2458-59 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Xavier Becerra)).
76. /d. at 1895.
77. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
78. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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battery conviction for pulling another woman's hair or selling ten dollars
worth ofmarijuana. 79
B. Requiring Proportionality

The crimmigration literature presents a number of arguments that
certain types of deportation can be punitive, particularly post-entry
crime-based deportation. The majority of this literature moves from the
"deportation can be punitive" argument to discussions about the wisdom
of incorporating criminal-related constitutional protections into
immigration. As the name crimmigration suggests, the emphasis within
this literature is on criminal rather than civil punishment. Yet the
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence in the area of civil punishments
provides another avenue for substantive constitutional limitations on the
state's power to deport noncitizens.
In two different lines of cases, the Court has acknowledged that civil
sanctions can be punitive, and when they function as such they are
subject to certain constitutional limitations. The applicable constitutional
limitations are due to the punitive nature of the sanction rather than its
categorization as criminal or civil. 80 In the punitive damages line of
cases, the Court has concluded that the Due Process Clause protects
against "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards. 81 The Court's
reasoning addresses both a procedural and substantive basis upon which
the Due Process Clause provides this protection. In a different line of
cases, the Court has evaluated civil sanctions, such as in rem civil
forfeiture and fines, to determine whether or not they constitute
punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes or excessive fines under the
Eighth Amendment. 82 In these cases, the Court recognized that civil
proceedings can advance punitive goals and that punishment "cuts across

79. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 485 n.77 (citing Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home;
'This Has Got Me in Some Kind of Whirlwind', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at Al3; Patrick
J. McDonnell, Deportation Shatters Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at Bl).
80. For the purposes of this Essay, I am not addressing the civil punishment cases
challenged on Double Jeopardy grounds because the Court has concluded that in order
for Double Jeopardy protection to apply, both sanctions must be criminal punishments.
Ursery, 518 U.S. at 273-74; Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99. Consequently the inquiry
regarding the civil punishment focuses on determining whether or not it constitutes a
criminal punishment despite its denomination as civil. See Hudson, 522 U.S. 97; Usery,
518 U.S. 267; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767; Halper, 490 U.S. 435.
81. BMW, 517 U.S. 559; TXO, 509 U.S. 443.
82. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97; Usery, 518 U.S. 267; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767;
Halper, 490 U.S. 435.
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the division between the civil and the criminallaw." 83 Consequently, the
Court sought to determine whether or not the applicable sanction sought
served the goals of punishment--deterrence and retribution. 84
The Court's approach to Double Jeopardy claims shifted in 1997
when the Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause only protects
against multiple criminal punishments. 85 The Court did not disavow its
earlier conclusions regarding civil punishments, just that such
punishments were not prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 86 In the
area of excessive fines however, the Court has maintained that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against excessive fines is not limited to criminal
punishments. 87 Consequently, excessive fmes in the civil context are
subject to the excessive fines provision of the Eighth Amendment. The
key issue in such cases is whether or not the fine constitutes punishment,
and the Court has examined history and congressional intent in making
this determination. 88
Both the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause provide
substantive limits on punishment. 89 The punitive damages cases provide
an analytical framework for thinking about the Fifth Amendment as
providing a substantive limitation on the state's power to deport
noncitizens by requiring proportionality.90 The three cases that provide
the basis for constitutional protection against "grossly excessive"
punitive damages awards are Has lip, TXO Production Corp., and BMW.
In 1991, the Court acknowledged for the first time that the Due Process
Clause provided a procedural and a substantive limit on the size of
punitive damages awards.91
In 1981, an agent for Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
misappropriated health insurance premiums from city employees in
Alabama, including Cleopatra Haslip. 92 Consequently Haslip's health
83. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97; Usery, 518 U.S. 267; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767;
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48.
84. Hudson , 522 U.S. at 97; Usery, 518 U.S. 267; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767;
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
85. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-103 .
86. /d.
87. /d. at 610.
88. See id.; Austin, 509 U.S. at 610,619-20.
89. See Karl an, supra note 22, at 882 n.l 0.
90. The punitive damages cases analyze the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but nothing in the Court's analysis prohibits a similar reading of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause and a number of lower courts have already done so. A.
Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The E"or of Federal
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. I 085 (2006).
91. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
92. /d. at 4-5.
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insurance was cancelled, which ultimately adversely affected her credit. 93
A jury in Alabama awarded Has lip $1,040,000, which the Court noted
probably included punitive damages of at least $840,000 and
compensatory damages of $200.00. 94 The Supreme Court of Alabama
affirmed the damages award, which Pacific Mutual appealed claiming
that the punitive damages award violated due process. 95
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the damages award but
acknowledged that the Due Process Clause limits the range of available
punitive damages. 96 The Court noted that allowing juries to determine
punitive damages was not itself a violation of due process, but that
"general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the
court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional
calculus."97 The fact that the punitive damages award was four times the
amount of compensatory damages was noted. 98 Because, however, the
award "did not lack objective criteria," the Court concluded that it did
"not cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety."99
Two years later, the Court was faced with another Due Process
Clause challenge to a punitive damages award in TXO Production Corp.
In this case, Justice Stevens joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Blackmun explicitly reviewed the punitive damages award to
determine if it violated the substantive limits imposed by the Due
Process Clause. 100 In a dispute over oil and gas rights, TXO filed a
frivolous declaratory judgment action in an effort to defraud Alliance
Resources. 101 A jury awarded Alliance Resources $19,000 in actual
damages and ten million dollars in punitive damages. 102 Despite the
"dramatic disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award,"
these justices concluded that the punitive damages award was not
unconstitutionally excessive. 103 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in
the judgment, but wrote separately to express their disagreement with the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
I 02.
I 03.

!d. at 5.
!d. at 6 nn.l-2.
!d. at 7.
!d. at 19.
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
!d. at 23.
!d. at 23-24.
TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-62.
!d. at 449.
!d. at 451.
!d. at 462.
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existence of a "so-called 'substantive due process' right that punitive
damages be reasonable." 104
The plurality in TXO Production Corp. became a majority in BMW
when the Court announced that the "Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing 'grossly
excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor." 105 With the introduction of
guideposts for determining when a punitive damages award would
violate substantive due process, the Court concluded that the $2 million
punitive damages award was "grossly excessive." 106
Dr. Ira Gore, Jr. sued BMW of North America (BMW) after he
found out that his car bad been repainted by BMW.' 07 BMW bad a policy
of repainting cars that were damaged during transport. 108 If the cost of
repairing the damage was less than three percent of the suggested retail
price then the car was sold as new and the dealer was not informed that
repairs bad been made. 109 Dr. Gore sought $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages, which the jury awarded. 110
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages award to $2
million, which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded was still
constitutionally unreasonable. 111
As a procedural matter, the Due Process Clause dictates that
individuals are entitled to fair notice "not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a
State may impose." 112 As such, juries must be instructed on the purpose
of punitive damages, the appropriate factors to take into account when
deciding to award punitive damages, and how much if such damages are
awarded. 113 In each of the three critical cases previously discussed, there
was little debate that punitive damages awards are subject to procedural
due process requirements. What was more contentious, and has proved
controversial, is the conclusion that substantive due process protects
104. !d. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality opinion "makes explicit
what was implicit in Haslip," a substantive due process right to reasonable punitive
damages).
105. BMW, 517 U.S. at 562 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454).
106. /d. at 574-75.
I 07. /d. at 559.
I 08. !d. at 563-64.
109. !d.
110. /d. at 564-65.
Ill. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567.
112. !d. at 574; see also Spencer, supra note 91, at 1093 ("Punitive awards going
beyond the level that the guideposts suggest as foreseeable would be considered
unconstitutionally excessive because defendants would lack adequate notice that such
damages could attach to their conduct.").
113. Karlan, supra note 23, at 904.
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against excessively large punitive damages awards. In BMW, the Court
not only had a majority for this holding, it found that the punitive
damages awarded were in fact "grossly excessive."
Punitive damage awards that are "grossly excessive" in relation to
the state's interests in punishment and deterrence are arbitrary. 114 It is
this arbitrariness that constitutes a substantive due process violation. 115
Courts now have three guideposts for determining whether or not a
punitive damages award is grossly excessive. The first examines the
gravity of the offense, second the ratio between the harm, or potential
harm, caused, and the punitive damages, and finally the difference
between the damages award and the authorized civil penalties. 116
Grossly excessive punitive damages awards are problematic from a
substantive due process perspective because they exceed what is
"reasonably necessary to punish and deter." 117 As such, the state exceeds
its authority in awarding such damages and acts arbitrarily. 118 Numerous
scholars agreeing with Justices Scalia and Thomas have critiqued the
identification of a substantive due process right to reasonable punitive
damages. 119 Yet as Pam Karlan has noted, "the Constitution certainly
provides sufficient support for concluding that punishment cannot be
excessive or arbitrarily unrelated to a defendant's misdeeds, and even in
the absence of a constitutional command, it is hard to imagine an
· f:avor o f arb.1tranness.
·
" 120
argument m
Concern regarding arbitrary punishment is particularly problematic
when other fundamental rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, such
as family privacy, are implicated. The Due Process Clause protects
against government intrusion within a specific "realm of personal
liberty." 121 This realm is limited to "those fundamental rights and

114. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568; Haslip, 23 U.S. at 23; see also Karlan, supra note 23, at
904.
115. The Human Rights Committee has also used proportionality review to examine
claims that the deportation of certain noncitizens would constitute an arbitrary
interference with their right to family life as protected by the International Covenant on
Australia, U.N.
Doc.
Civil and Political Rights. See Madafferi v.
CCPR/C/81/D/101112001 (U.N. Human Rights Comm., Aug. 26, 2004); Winata v.
Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (U.N. Human Rights Comm., Aug. 16,
2001).
116. BMW,517U.S.at575.
117. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
118. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462; BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
119. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 91.
120. Karlan, supra note 23, at 882.
121. Planned Parenthood ofSe. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847 (1992). Justice Harlan
has noted:
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liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 122 Rights
regarding family privacy have long been recognized as fundamental
rights and deportation often threatens noncitizens' right to family
integrity. 123 While family privacy is not absolute, government
interference with such rights generally warrants heightened judicial
scrutiny. 124 Such scrutiny currently does not exist for deportation
decisions. Although noncitizens ordered deported can challenge their
eligibility for deportation, once eligibility has been conceded or proved,
noncitizens do not have a forum in which they can challenge their
deportation as disproportionate. Congress has never recognized any
limitations on its power to define deportable noncitizens or the
executive's power to execute the deportation grounds. The INA has only
ever provided for discretionary relief from deportation. This relief is
based on grace rather than any rights held by the noncitizens. 125 In 1996,
eligibility for cancellation of removal became more stringent as certain
noncitizens were ineligible for relief and others had to demonstrate that
their removal would constitute an exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to their U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent, or child. 126 Prior to
1996, the INA did not dictate a standard of hardship for obtaining
discretionary relief from deportation. Section 212(c) of the INA 127
granted the Attorney General the discretion to not apply the
This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking
of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and
bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ....
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v.
Connecticut, 301 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
123. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 ("Our decisions establish that the Constitution
protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-86 ( 1965); see also Spencer, supra note 91, at 1121.
124. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by
a 'compelling state interest,' ... and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (internal citations omitted)).
125. See supra Part II. A for further discussion of discretionary relief from deportation.
126. INA§ 240A(b) (8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (West 2010)).
127. Section 212( c) of the INA was the statutory provision that provided for
discretionary relief from exclusion and deportation. Similar relief was also available in
section 244-suspension of deportation.
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inadmissibility or deportation grounds to LPRs who had resided in the
United States for seven consecutive years. 128 The Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) developed a framework for determining how discretion
should be exercised, but the framework did not preclude relief based on
post-entry conduct nor did it specify a hardship standard. 129 Rather the
framework enabled immigration judges and the BIA to make
individualized determinations, 130 which provided a better framework for
ensuring that deportation is not excessive.
The Court's conclusion that the Due Process Clause prohibits
punishment that is "greater than reasonably necessary to punish and
deter" is an important development for deportation. 131 It opens the door
for new conversations about the scope of the state's power to deport
noncitizens. This jurisprudence suggests that deportation decisions, like
punitive damage awards, must be proportional and that excessive or
disproportionate deportation orders exceed the authority of the state to
regulate immigration.
The key to the usefulness of this line of cases is recognizing that at
times deportation can be punitive. Immigration scholars such as
Kanstroom, Legomsky, and Pauw have convincingly argued that certain
categories of deportations, particularly post-entry crime based, constitute
punishment. 132 Not only is deportation in these cases justified as a
mechanism for retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation, historically it
has been understood as punishment, and the legislative history of these
particular deportation grounds indicate a desire to punish. 133 While the
Court has maintained that deportation is not punishment, the relevant
cases have focused on a criminal/civil distinction that fails to recognize
that civil sanctions can constitute punishment. 134 The double jeopardy
and excessive fine cases discussed at the beginning of this section
provide the modem approach, which distinguishes remedial and punitive
sanctions. The analysis utilized in those cases support the idea that post128. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c) (West 1988); In re Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 194 (BIA
1990); In re Silva, 16 I. & N Dec. 26 (BIA 1976); Francis v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
129. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998); In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
581, 585-86 (BIA 1978).
130. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 10; In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec.
at 585-86.
131. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
132. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21; Legomsky, supra note 21; Pauw,
supra note 8.
133. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21; Legomsky, supra note 21; Pauw,
supra note 8.
134. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,235
(1896).
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entry crime-based deportation is punitive. 135 All of these cases provide a
framework for thinking about the Fifth Amendment as requiring
proportional deportation.
The Fifth Amendment is not the only basis for substantively
challenging the constitutionality of an immigration decision. In the past,
U.S. courts have examined First Amendment challenges and equal
protection challenges to admissions and deportation decisions. 136 When
faced with these challenges the plenary power doctrine has caused the
U.S. Supreme Court to utilize extremely deferential standards of review.
Use of these review standards has led the Court to conclude that the
state's immigration decisions did not violate the constitution. 137 This
deferential approach grows out of two key nineteenth-century
conclusions about the state's immigration power. The first is that,
pursuant to international law, a state's power to exclude and deport
noncitizens is unlimited. 138 The second is that the power to regulate
immigration is a power intimately connected to foreign affairs and
national security. 139 The U.S. Constitution allocates these powers to the
federal government and, more specifically, to the political branches. 140
Thus, due to concerns about institutional competence, the Court has
concluded that the judiciary should defer to the political branches in the
area of immigration. 141 Consequently, the plenary power doctrine could
similarly block meaningful judicial review of Fifth Amendment
challenges to disproportionate deportation. The Court has, however, been
willing to utilize traditional standards of review in immigration cases that
have implicated punishment. For example, in Wong Wing v. United
States, the Court concluded that imprisonment with hard labor for
unlawful presence in the United Stated constituted punishment and
violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 142 The Court stated that,
"when congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by subjecting
the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by
confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid, must
provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused." 143
135. See supra Part II.B.
136. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972).
137. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792, 800; Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-70.
138. See Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
139. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
140. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711-13; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
141. Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713-15; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 601-02.
142. 163 u.s. 228.
143. /d. at 237.
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A key to more searching judicial review of deportation decisions is
conceptualizing certain forms of deportation as punishment rather than as
civil remedial measure. As noted above, deportation, at the time of Fang
Yue Ting, was utilized as extended border control rather than post-entry
social control. 144 The expanded use of deportation as punishment rather
than as a remedy for admissions mistakes has created a category of
deportation in which the nineteenth-century conclusions regarding the
power to deport no longer apply. When deportation takes on a punitive
purpose, both international law and the U.S. Constitution provide that the
state's power is not unlimited. Both sources of law place limits on the
state's power vis-a-vis individuals and proportional deportation respects
those limits.
Ill. ACHIEVING PROPORTIONALITY

Proportional deportation does not require reconceptualizing
deportation as criminal, only as punitive. Other scholars have pointed out
the constitutional protections that would attach to deportation if it were
understood as a criminal punishment. 145 Concerns about excessive
deportation can be addressed through a variety of constitutional
provisions. 146 I contend that the Fifth Amendment protections of due
process, both substantive and procedural, provide the basis necessary to
achieve proportional deportation. In this Article, I seek to maintain
immigration as a civil regulatory system. 147
Currently, proportionality plays a minor role in deportation
decisions. Discretionary relief from deportation in the form of
cancellation of removal is based on proportionality principles. The
Attorney General has the authority to cancel the removal of certain
noncitizens if such action would be in the best interests of the United
States. 148 The type of proportionality review currently conducted does
not acknowledge that noncitizens have substantive constitutional rights
that may be implicated by deportation. Rather, immigration judges and
the BIA seek to balance the undesirability of the noncitizen (e.g.,
144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
146. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 526 ("even when a specific constitutional right is
held inoperative in deportation proceedings, a near equivalent is sometimes available");
see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102-03 (noting that the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause protect individuals from irrational sanctions).
147. I agree with Legomsky's suggestion that "the civil regulatory model should be the
guiding star of immigration law with respect to both enforcement and adjudication."
Legomsky, supra note 21, at 524-25.
148. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at II.
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criminal activity) with the interests of the noncitizen in remaining in the
United States. 149 This type of review does not provide a forum in which
the government can determine whether or not a specific deportation
decision is grossly excessive. While federal court review of deportation
decisions could provide a forum for such review, the jurisdictional bar on
reviewing discretionary decisions and the deferential standard of review
applied in immigration cases prevent the federal courts from serving in
this capacity. 15 Consequently, legislative and administrative reforms are
necessary to protect against grossly excessive deportations.
Proportionality has played a more explicit role in evaluating
deportation decisions before the European Court of Human Rights and
the Human Rights Committee. As a result of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR) and the ICCPR, noncitizens
in state parties to these treaties have successfully challenged deportation
decisions as a violation of the noncitizens' right to family life. 151 In
determining whether or not noncitizens' right to family life has been
impermissibly infringed upon both the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the bodies
responsible for enforcing the ECHR and the ICCPR respectively,
conduct a proportionality analysis. 152 As a result of this analysis, both
bodies have concluded that certain deportation decisions violated the
respective treaties. 153
Human rights scholars and activists have looked to this jurisprudence
as a basis for reforming not only U.S. deportation jurisprudence, but also
increasing U.S. compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. 154
This literature argues that U.S. judges should play a bigger role in
enforcing U.S. treaty obligations, and international treaty body
jurisprudence provides a guide for judges to do so. 155 I have argued

°

149. !d.
150. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
151. See ICCPR, supra note 20; European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
ECHR].
152. See, e.g., Mokrani v. France, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 5 (2003); Ezzouhdi v. France, App.
No. 47160/99 (2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int.
153. See, e.g., Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 801 (1992); Nasri v. France, 21
Eur. Ct. H.R. 223 (1999).
154. See generally Shayana Kadidal, Symposium: Panel II: The Role of International
Bodies Influencing U.S. Policy: "Federalizing" Immigration Law: International Law as
a Limitation on Congress's Power to Legislate in the Field of Immigration, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 501 (2008); Kenneth Roth, AEI Conference Trends in Global Governance: Do
They Threaten American Sovereignty? Article and Response: The Charade of US
Ratification ofInternational Human Rights Treaties, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 347 (2000).
155. /d.
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elsewhere that the transplant approach in the immigration context is
misguided for three reasons. First, the ECtHR and HRC jurisprudence is
based on governmental structures that differ from the structure of
government in the United States; second, this jurisprudence is based on a
different conception of the state power at play in immigration regulation;
and finally, the Supreme Court has historically rejected its role as a treaty
enforcer vis-a-vis the federal government. 156 This does not counsel in
favor of ignoring U.S. human rights treaty obligations or divesting courts
of their enforcement role. Rather, it suggests that human rights treaty
compliance is an issue that should be addressed through domestic
translation and adaptation rather than transplanting foreign
jurisprudence. 157 The approach to achieving proportional deportation
advocated in this essay reflects a translation and adaptation approach to
treaty compliance. Rather than seeking to import the HRC and ECtHR
jurisprudence, I provide the relevant principles and rights within U.S.
law and offer a legal analysis that facilitates treaty compliance.
A. Domestic Legal Basis

Section 240A of the INA provides the statutory basis for cancellation
of removal. 158 The Attorney General "may cancel removal in the case of
an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States if the
alien" satisfies the articulated prerequisites. 159 The prerequisites are that
the lawful permanent resident (LPR) must have held that status for at
least five years, have resided in the United States for at least seven years,
and not have been convicted of an aggravated felony. 16 For noncitizens
who do not meet these criteria, cancellation of removal is available if the
noncitizen has been physically present in the United States for at least ten
years, is a person of good moral character, has not been convicted of
specified crimes, 161 and demonstrates that his or her removal would

°

156. See Banks, Deporting Families, supra note 18; Angela M. Banks, The Trouble
with Treaties: Immigration & Judicial Review, ST. JOHN L. REv. (forthcoming 2011)
[hereinafter The Trouble with Treaties].
157. See Angela M. Banks, CEDAW. Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights
Enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 781 (2009).
158. Prior to the 1996 immigration reforms discretionary relief from deportation was
governed by INA§ 212(c) (current version at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (West 2010).
159. INA§ 240A(a).
160. /d. Section 212(c) relief was available to LPRs who had resided in the United
States for at least seven years. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c) (1988).
161. These crimes include convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, violations
of controlled substance laws, convictions for two or more offenses for which the
aggregate sentence of imprisonment was more than five years, prostitution, human
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"result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 162
The statute does not provide guidelines or instructions as to how the
Attorney General should exercise his or her discretion in granting
cancellation of removal. 163 Once a noncitizen satisfies the prerequisites,
Congress left it to the Attorney General to decide to whom or when
cancellation of removal should be granted! 64 In In re C-V-T-, the BIA
established guidelines for making this decision. 165 An immigration judge
"must balance the adverse factors evidencing the alien's undesirability as
a permanent resident with the social and humane considerations
presented in his (or her) behalf to determine whether the granting of ...
relief appears in the best interest of this country." 166 Favorable factors
considered by immigration judges include: family ties to the United
States, length of residence in the United States, evidence of hardship to
the individual deemed deportable and their family in the case of
deportation, employment history, property or business ties to the United
States, service in the U.S. Armed Forces, value and service to the
community, proof of genuine rehabilitation from criminal behavior, and
other evidence of good character. 167 Adverse factors considered by
immigration judges include: the nature and underlying circumstances of
the exclusion or deportation ground at issue, additional significant
violations of U.S. immigration law, a criminal record, and other evidence
of bad character! 68
Immigration judges and the BIA seek to balance the interests of the
United States with those of the noncitizen and their U.S. citizen or LPR
family members. This inquiry, however, focuses on the best interests of
the United States without recognizing the substantive rights of
noncitizens implicated by deportation. This is particularly problematic
when one considers the prerequisites for cancellation of removal and the
types of deportations that are most likely punitive-crime-related
trafficking, money laundering, aggravated felonies, domestic violence, and immigration
document fraud. INA§§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), 237(a)(3).
162. rNA§ 240A(b)(l)(D).
163. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 10 ("Section 240A(a) does not provide express
direction as to how this discretion is to be exercised.").
164. !d.
165. !d.
166. !d. at II (quoting In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584-85).
167. In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
168. !d. Immigration judges evaluating claims for cancellation of removal rely on the
same factors outlined in In re Marin for section 212(c) relief. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. at 11-12.
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deportation. Section 240A not only states that individuals deportable for
specific crimes are ineligible for cancellation of removal, it also requires
good moral character. 169 While these lists are duplicative in many
instances, these prerequisites ensure that the deportation cases that are
most likely to be punitive are the ones in which there is no institutional
mechanism to ensure proportionality.
The factors outlined in In re C- V- T- provide a basis for
proportionality review; however this framework is based on the idea of
grace rather than balancing the interests of the state with the substantive
rights of the noncitizen. 170 The punitive damages cases dictate that civil
punishments must be proportionate because excessive punishment
exceeds the authority of the state to punish and violates the substantive
due process rights of the individual. 171 Applying this rationale to the
deportation context requires recognizing, first, that the state's power to
punish is limited and, second, that noncitizens' due process rights protect
against excessive punishment. Determining when deportation becomes
grossly excessive is a task that does not lend itself to a bright line rule.
Like the In re C- V-T- approach, this should be addressed in
individualized determinations.
To enable immigration judges and the BIA to make these
individualized determinations, the Attorney General would need greater
authority to grant cancellation of removal, similar to the INA section
212(c) regime. Under section 212(c), relief from deportation could be
granted to a wider range of noncitizens. The 1996 reforms significantly
curtailed the Attorney General's authority by excluding noncitizens
convicted of specific crimes and those without good moral character
from eligibility for cancellation of removal. 172 Removing these
prerequisites would enable the Attorney General to evaluate a wider
range of deportation decisions to ensure that they are not grossly
excessive. This type of legislative reform is particularly important
because it is the crime-based deportations that are punitive and thus
subject to the due process grossly excessive limitation.
It is possible to read section 240A of the INA as representing
Congress' conclusions as to when deportation could be grossly
excessive. As such, one could argue that adjudicators should defer to the
169. Individuals who have been imprisoned for an aggregate period of 180 days or
more, convicted of an aggravated felony, or are inadmissible pursuant to fNA §
212(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C) will not be regarded as having good moral character. See INA §
IOl(t). Pursuant to this provision numerous other individuals will not be regarded as
having good moral character. /d.
170. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
171. BMW, 517 U.S. 559; TXO, 509 U.S . 443; Haslip, 499 U.S. I.
172. See Kanstroom, Deportation, supra note 21 , at 1891 .
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political actors' decisions regarding proportionality. If proportionality
were only a matter of grace and discretion this approach to cancellation
of removal could be acceptable. However, to the extent proportionality is
constitutionally required, as I contend that it is in specific deportation
contexts, an individualized proportionality assessment is required.
In order to obtain such an assessment today, an individual would
seek cancellation of removal during a removal proceeding, appeal the
denial to the BIA, and appeal the BIA's denial to a U.S. Court of
Appeals. While the INA grants federal appellate courts jurisdiction to
review constitutional claims and questions of law, it prohibits federal
court review of discretionary decisions. 173 Thus, a noncitizen could raise
a Due Process Clause challenge to a deportation order. The federal courts
do not, however, provide a meaningful mechanism for ensuring that the
state does not exceed its authority to punish when it deports
noncitizens. 174 The continued reliance on the plenary power doctrine in
cases raising substantive constitutional challenges has limited the federal
courts' ability to provide this oversight.
The key to providing an institutional mechanism for individualized
proportionality determinations is creating a category of relief from
removal that is rights-based rather than discretionary and ensuring that
the Attorney General can consider all factors necessary to ensure that a
deportation order is not disproportionate. This could be achieved through
the creation of a new form of relief from deportation available only in
cases of crime-related deportation. Congress could grant the Attorney
General broad authority to grant cancellation of removal in crime-related
deportation cases, and the Department of Justice could adopt regulations
requiring proportionality review by immigration judges and the BIA in
these cases.
In BMW, the U.S. Supreme Court presented three guideposts for
determining when punitive damages are grossly excessive and thus
unconstitutional. 175 The guideposts require a court to examine (1) the
gravity or reprehensibility of the offense, (2) the disparity between the
harm suffered by the victim and the compensation paid by the tortfeasor,
and (3) the available civil and/or criminal penalties available. 176
Regulations adopted by the Department of Justice could provide similar
guidance to immigration judges and the BIA. While the relevant factors
in the deportation context would vary slightly, they would similarly seek
to evaluate (1) whether or not the deportation is based upon behavior
173.
174.
175.
176.

INA§ 242(a)(2)(8), (D) (West 2010).
See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
517 U.S. 559.
ld at 574-75.
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generally deemed reprehensible; (2) whether or not the behavior in a
particular case is problematic enough to warrant deportation; and finally
(3) how deportation compares to other civil and/or criminal sanctions
available for the same behavior. The factors examined in In re C- V- Twould be instructive to this inquiry, but the test must be whether or not
deportation in light of these factors is grossly excessive, not whether
relief from deportation is in the best interest of the country.
The first guidepost allows immigration judges and the BIA to
examine the general reprehensibility of the activities giving rise to
deportation. 177 As the Court noted in BMW, damages "should reflect 'the
enormity of his offense. "' 178 Similarly deportation grounds should reflect
the enormity of the prescribed activity. Due to the statutory basis of
deportation grounds, there is a certain degree of deference that should be
given to Congress in its decisions regarding what conduct is
reprehensible enough to warrant deportation. The role of immigration
judges and the BIA is not to second-guess this general decision but to
ensure that its implementation in individual cases is not excessive. 179
This gives rise to the second guidepost, which allows for an
individualized assessment. Immigration judges and the BIA would
examine the facts giving rise to the criminal conviction and other
relevant factors to determine whether or not deportation would be grossly
excessive. For example, due to the definition of an aggravated felony a
noncitizen has been ordered deported due to a misdemeanor battery
conviction for pulling another woman's hair. 180 While the broad
categories of deportable crimes may include actions grave or serious
enough to warrant deportation, they can also include hair-pulling. Our
existing system does not provide an effective institutional mechanism to
ensure that an assault conviction for hair-pulling is not treated the same
. . 181
as a rape or murder convtctlon.

177. !d. at 577 ("Perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.").
178. /d. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363,371 (1852)).
179. Legomsky, supra note 21, at 523 ("[T]he asymmetric incorporation of criminal
justice norms into immigration law prevents proportionate treatment at the micro level.").
180. !d. at 486.
181. Legomsky has noted that:
The relentless expansions of the list of crimes that render even long-term
lawfully admitted permanent residents deportable, coupled with the narrowing
of the grounds on which compassionate discretionary relief can be dispensed in
deserving cases, ... mean that the most trivial misstep can result in devastating
loss with no possibility of discretionary relief.
/d. at 524.
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Finally, the third guidepost looks to the availability of civil or
criminal penalties as an indicator of excessiveness. 182 As discussed in
Part I, it is crime-based deportation that can be punitive rather than
remedial. Subjecting noncitizens to both criminal penalties and
deportation for the same activity suggests excessiveness. 183 Criminal
penalties reflect a legislature's assessment of the appropriate level of
incarceration or fine necessary to achieve the retributive, deterrence, or
incapacitation goals of punishment. Tacking on deportation for
noncitizens subjects this discrete portion of the population to additional
punishment. This is excessive absent an argument that satisfying the
retributive, deterrence, or incapacitation goals of punishment is more
difficult with noncitizens than it is with citizens. Our criminal justice
system traditionally does not differentiate amongst the population when
creating civil or criminal punishments. 184 Rather, judges are provided
with ranges and given discretion to determine what the actual
punishment will be. 185 Having a system that imposes additional
punishment upon noncitizens requires theoretical and empirical support
for the idea that the retributive, deterrence, and/or incapacitation goals of
criminal punishment cannot be met without deportation. At this time, that
. 186
support d oes not extst.
Granting the Attorney General the authority to cancel the removal of
noncitizens based on a proportionality review provides a mechanism for
ensuring that deportation decisions are not excessive. Offering an
administrative solution to the need for proportionality allows one to
avoid the problems that the plenary power doctrine poses to substantive
constitutional challenges. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to
182. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583; Legomsky, supra note 21, at 519 ("The question in all
these contexts is whether the dual consequences are reasonably proportionate to the
misconduct.").
183. See Legomsky, supra note 21, at 519 (discussing legislative decisions regarding
punishment as an indicator of what is considered adequate for retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation goals).
184. See generally U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2009) (providing a system
whereby civil and criminal punishments are imposed absent consideration as to whether
the defendant is a citizen or non-citizen).
185. /d.
186. The Court has stated that it is permissible for individuals to be subjected to both
civil and criminal penalties for the same conduct without violating double jeopardy.
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 98-99; Ursery, 518 U.S. at 274-75. Yet this is within a framework
that does not differentiate between segments of the population. If deportation is going to
be an additional punishment available to noncitizens on top of the criminal sanctions
available to citizens, Congress must make actual findings about the ability to achieve the
retributive, deterrence, and/or incapacitation goals of criminal punishment within the
citizen versus noncitizen population.
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recognize that the Fifth Amendment requires that deportation decisions
must be proportionate to the basis for deportation, the Court may decline
to conduct the proportionality review. Pursuant to the plenary power
doctrine, courts have utilized deferential standards of review when
exammmg substantive constitutional challenges to immigration
decisions. The same approach could be adopted in this instance whereby
the Court would defer to the political actors' deportation decisions based
on the notion that these actors adhered to their constitutional obligations
in ordering and upholding a deportation decision. Granting the Attorney
General greater discretion to cancel removals does not address the
broader rule of law concerns regarding the unchecked power of political
actors in administering our immigration system. It does however provide
some mechanisms for ensuring that the constitutional rights of
noncitizens are protected within the immigration context. The Supreme
Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence recognizes a substantive
due process right to proportionate civil punishment. Post-entry crimebased deportations are a type of civil punishment based on the historical
use of deportation for this purpose, congressional intent, and the severity
of the consequences. Congressional reform to empower the Attorney
General to make these determinations not only ensures that the state acts
within the scope of its power to deport under the U.S. Constitution, but
also under the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.
B. Treaty Compliance Implications

Disproportionate deportation is an issue of concern that has been
raised by immigration and human rights scholars. 187 For human rights
scholars, this issue fits within larger discussions regarding treaties as
important sources of individual rights and domestic treaty
enforcement. 188 Treaties like the ICCPR, which the United States ratified
in 1992, protect a variety of rights that are not explicitly protected by the
U.S. Constitution or federal law. 189 Therefore, the ICCPR is seen as an
important tool for protecting individual rights vis-a-vis the government.
Yet because the ICCPR is not a self-executing treaty and the United
States has not adopted implementing legislation, the ICCPR cannot form

187. See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 21.
188. Daniel Kanstroom, Symposium: United States Immigration Policy at the
Millennium: Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889 (2000); Kenneth Roth, supra note
155.
189. For example, provisions of both the ICCPR and ECHR explicitly protect the right
to family life. See ICCPR, supra note 20, at art. 17; ECHR, supra note 152, at art. 8.
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the basis of a legal claim in a U.S. court. Consequently, U.S. courts play
no role in enforcing U.S. obligations under the ICCPR. Deportation is
one of many contexts in which human rights scholars and activists see a
role for the ICCPR to play in moderating state action. 190 Based on the
HRC and the ECtHR jurisprudence, the right to family life is seen as an
effective check on the state's power to deport noncitizens. 191 Human
rights scholars have therefore argued that this jurisprudence ought to be
incorporated by U.S. judges to ensure U.S. compliance with the
ICCPR. 192 For reasons detailed more extensively elsewhere,
transplanting this international jurisprudence is problematic for three
reasons. 193 This jurisprudence developed in states in which the state's
power to regulate immigration is based on the police power or public
order, while in the United States it is based on the power to regulate
foreign affairs and/or national security. These different conceptions of
the source of the power to regulate immigration play an important role in
allocating immigration authority. In the United States, the conception of
immigration as a national sovereignty matter has lead the judiciary to
grant significant deference to the decisions of political decision makers.
This judicial self-restraint stems from the constitutional grant of
authority over foreign affairs and national security to the federal political
branches. 194 In light of this notion of separation of powers, the judiciary
has exercised self-restraint in reviewing substantive constitutional
challenges to immigration decisions. 195 The judiciary in European states,
Canada, and Australia has not been as deferential, in large part because
regulating immigration is seen as a part of public order. 196 This is a
category of governmental action that the judiciary in these states has
traditionally reviewed to ensure compliance with substantive
fundamental rights guarantees. 197 The HRC and ECtHR deportation
jurisprudence is based on both of these factors in reviewing deportation
decisions to ensure proportionality. 198 Absent reconceptualizing
immigration as implicating police powers rather than national
190. Kadidal, Symposium, supra note 155; see also Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the
Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 1014-15 (1993).
191. James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission ofAliens Under International Law,
77 AM. J. lNT'L L. 804, 838-39 (1983).
192. See Scaperlanda, supra note 191.
193. See Banks, Deporting Families, supra note 18; Banks, The Trouble with Treaties,
supra note 157.
194. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. 581; Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698.
195. See Banks, Deporting Families, supra note 18.
196. /d.
197. See id.
198. See id at 7-32.
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sovereignty, U.S. courts will continue to exercise self-restraint. The
human rights treaty jurisprudence can only be transformative in the
United States if U.S. courts become less deferential, and rooting rights
claims in treaties is not the best route for decreasing judicial deference.
Historically, U.S. courts have shied away from enforcing treaty
obligations vis-a-vis federal actors. 199 In a line of treaty enforcement
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that compliance with treaty
obligations is a political decision for which the courts are ill suited to
evaluate. 200 I have argued elsewhere that this approach to treaty
enforcement played a significant role in the development of the plenary
power doctrine. 201
Relying on the ICCPR and the deportation jurisprudence of the HRC
and the ECtHR to soften the harshness of our current deportation regime
is problematic. This jurisprudence is based on a different conception of
the source of the immigration power, which leads to different allocations
of immigration authority. Furthermore, U.S. courts have been disinclined
to enforce treaty obligations vis-a-vis federal actors based on separation
of powers concerns. 202 These three factors simply highlight the need for a
different approach to domestic treaty enforcement. Rather than seeking
to implant successful jurisprudence from abroad, I contend that domestic
treaty enforcement is more successful once states translate and adapt
their treaty obligations for the local context. Work by immigration
scholars to think about deportation as punitive, and identifying the
relevant constitutional protections that would attach, provides a domestic
approach to achieving proportional deportation, which is arguably
required by the ICCPR. 203
IV. CONCLUSION
Deportation has taken on new purposes and goals since 1893 when
Fong Yue Ting was decided. Federal law not only provides for the
deportation of noncitizens who should not have been admitted and those
who were never admitted, but it also requires deportation based on postentry behavior. The growing use of deportation for post-entry behavior,
particularly criminal behavior indicates that deportation is no longer a
remedial measure; it is now also a punitive measure. Historically,
communities have used deportation, also referred to as banishment or
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See generally Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REv. 571 (2007).
See Banks, The Trouble with Treaties, supra note 157.
See id.
See Wu, supra note 200.
See Banks, Deporting Families, supra note 18.
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transportation, to remove "undesirables" from the communities' borders.
In expanding the definition of an aggravated felony, members of
Congress have expressed their desire to create harsher punishments for
noncitizens who commit crimes. These developments defy the
categorization of deportation as non-punitive. With a growing class of
punitive deportations, institutional mechanisms are needed to ensure that
these deportation decisions are not arbitrary. The current system for
discretionary relief from deportation is inadequate primarily because it is
unavailable in precisely the deportation cases that are punitive. Pursuant
to international human rights jurisprudence, states' power to deport
noncitizens is not unlimited. The scope of that power is shaped by the
individual rights protected in treaties like the ICCPR and the ECHR. The
U.S. Constitution provides similar individual rights and constraints on
government power. The U.S. Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence has recognized an important limit on the state's power to
authorize civil punishments-proportionality. Grossly excessive civil
punishments exceed the state's power to punish. Similarly, grossly
excessive deportation orders exceed the state's power to punish, and
crime-based deportations are a form of civil punishment.
The U.S. Constitution provides a basis for proportional deportation.
U.S. courts do not have to import international human rights
jurisprudence to achieve this outcome. Effective implementation of
human rights obligations requires states to translate and adapt their
obligations for the domestic context. Conceptualizing deportation as
punishment and applying the requisite constitutional protections is an
example of such translation and adaptation. This approach to regulating
deportation provides a mechanism for ensuring that the state does not
exercise its deportation power arbitrarily as required by the ICCPR, but
also, and perhaps more importantly, by the U.S. Constitution.
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